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Employing a large number of real and financial indicators, we use Bayesian Model Averaging (BMA)
to forecast real-time measures of economic activity. Importantly, the predictor set includes option-adjusted
credit spread indexes based on bond portfolios sorted by maturity and credit risk as measured by the
issuer’s “distance-to-default.”  The portfolios are constructed directly from the secondary market prices
of outstanding senior unsecured bonds issued by a large number of U.S. corporations. Our results indicate
that relative to an autoregressive benchmark, BMA yields consistent improvements in the prediction
of the growth rates of real GDP, business fixed investment, industrial production, and employment,
as well as of the changes in the unemployment rate, at horizons from the current quarter (i.e., “nowcasting”)
out to four quarters hence. The gains in forecast accuracy are statistically significant and economically
important and owe exclusively to the inclusion of our portfolio credit spreads in the set of predictors—BMA
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One area of agreement among economists at universities, central banks, and Wall Street is that
forecasting economic activity is hard. While the existing methods give us some ability to forecast
economic developments for the current quarter and perhaps the quarter after that, their predictive
power is modest at best and deteriorates rapidly as the forecast horizon extends beyond the very
near term. Moreover, what little predictability there seems to be appears to be captured about
as well by simple models—such as a univariate autogression—as by the large number of complex
statistical and DSGE forecasting methods that have been proposed in the literature (cf. Sims [2005];
Tulip [2005]; Faust and Wright [2009]; and Edge and G¨ urkaynak [2010]).
Economists have long sought to improve on this record by using information from ﬁnancial
markets. Because they are inherently forward looking, the argument goes, ﬁnancial market prices
should impound information about investors’ expectations of future economic outcomes.1 From
a theoretical perspective, default-risk indicators such as credit spreads—the diﬀerence in yields
between various corporate debt instruments and government securities of comparable maturity—
are particularly well suited for forecasting economic activity. Philippon [2009], for example, presents
a model in which the decline in investment fundamentals, owing to a reduction in the expected
present-value of corporate cash ﬂows, leads to a widening of credit spreads prior to a cyclical
downturn. As emphasized by Bernanke et al. [1999] and Gilchrist and Zakrajˇ sek [2010], increases
in credit spreads can also signal disruptions in the supply of credit resulting from the worsening
in the quality of corporate balance sheets or from the deterioration in the health of ﬁnancial
intermediaries that supply credit.
The empirical success of default-risk indicators as predictors of economic activity is decidedly
mixed, however, with results varying substantially across various credit spread indexes and diﬀerent
time periods. For example, the “paper-bill” spread—the diﬀerence between yields on nonﬁnancial
commercial paper and comparable-maturity Treasury bills—had substantial forecasting power for
economic activity during the 1970s and the 1980s, only to see its predictive ability vanish in the
subsequent decade. In contrast, credit spreads based on indexes of speculative-grade (i.e., “junk”)
corporate bonds, which contain information from markets that were not in existence before the
mid-1980s, have done particularly well at forecasting output growth during the 1990s, according
to Gertler and Lown [1999] and Mody and Taylor [2004]. Stock and Watson [2003], however, show
that the forecasting ability of this default-risk indicator is considerably more uneven.
In a recent paper, Gilchrist et al. [2009] (GYZ hereafter) argue that these mixed results may be
1Financial indicators considered in this vast literature include stock prices (Fama [1981] and Harvey [1989]);
spreads between long and short-term risk-free interest rates (Harvey [1988]; Estrella and Hardouvelis [1991];
Estrella and Mishkin [1998]; and Hamilton and Kim [2002]); the term structure of interest rates more generally
(Ang et al. [2006]); spreads between rates on short-term commercial paper and rates on Treasury bills (Bernanke
[1990]; Friedman and Kuttner [1992, 1998]; and Emery [1999]); and yield spreads on longer-term corporate debt
(Gertler and Lown [1999]; King et al. [2007]; Mueller [2007]; Gilchrist et al. [2009]; and Gilchrist and Zakrajˇ sek
[2010]).
1due to the fact that the credit spread indexes used by researchers tend to be based on aggregates
of returns on a mishmash of bonds with diﬀerent duration, credit risk, and other characteristics.
In part to address these problems, GYZ constructed 20 monthly credit spread indexes for diﬀerent
maturity and credit risk categories using secondary market prices of individual senior unsecured
corporate bonds.2 Their ﬁndings indicate that these credit spread indexes have substantial pre-
dictive power, at both short- and longer-term horizons, for the growth of payroll employment and
industrial production. Moreover, they signiﬁcantly outperform the predictive ability of the stan-
dard default-risk indicators, a result that suggests that using “cleaner” measures of credit spreads
may, indeed, lead to more accurate forecasts of economic activity.
This paper extends the analysis of GYZ in several dimensions. Most importantly, we provide
a thorough evaluation of the marginal information content of credit spreads in real-time economic
forecasting. Given the extensive and ongoing search for consistent predictors of U.S. economic
activity, the macroeconomics profession runs a substantial risk that results like those of GYZ are
due to researchers stumbling on variables that just happen to ﬁt the existing sample, but which,
in reality, have no true predictive power. The regular breakdown of new forecasting relationships
soon after they are documented conﬁrms that this risk is real. Thus, it is especially important that
any such analysis takes into account model search and selection issues.
To guard against the problem of selecting ﬁnancial indicators that just happen to ﬁt our sample,
we adopt a Bayesian Model Averaging (BMA) approach. As explained more fully below, we add
the new credit spread indexes to a predictor set containing over 100 ﬁnancial indicators, as well
as a large number of real variables, and begin with a prior that each predictor is equally likely to
be useful in forecasting future economic activity. The posterior weight assigned to each predictor
in period t is then based on a Bayesian updating scheme that uses only the information available
at time t. While our BMA scheme has, under certain conditions, a formal Bayesian justiﬁcation,
we follow a large and growing literature that takes a frequentist perspective and relies on the
BMA framework as a pragmatic approach to data-based weighting of a large number of competing
prediction models (e.g., Min and Zellner [1993]; Fernandez et al. [2001b]; Avramov [2002]; Cremers
[2002]; Sala-i-Martin et al. [2004]; Koop and Potter [2004]; King et al. [2007]; and Wright [2008]).
While following GYZ’s basic approach for constructing credit spread indexes, we also improve
on their methodology by adjusting the underlying micro-level credit spreads for the call option
embedded in many of the underlying securities. As pointed out by Duﬀee [1998] and Duca [1999],
ﬂuctuations in the value of embedded options—reﬂecting shifts in the term structure of risk-free
rates—can substantially alter the information content of movements in corporate bond yields at
business cycle frequencies.
Our results indicate that the new credit spread indexes have considerable marginal predictive
power for economic activity. When using the entire set of predictors to forecast a wide array of
2GYZ measure the underlying credit risk by the issuer’s expected default frequency (EDF™), a market-based
default-risk indicator calculated by Moody’s/KMV that is more timely that the issuer’s credit rating.
2economic activity indicators, the gains in the root mean square forecast error (RMSFE)—relative
to a univariate autoregressive benchmark—are statistically signiﬁcant and often substantial in mag-
nitude: BMA forecasts generate 5 to 10 percent reductions in the RMSFEs at horizon zero (i.e.,
the “nowcast”) and between 10 and 25 percent improvement in predictive accuracy when forecast-
ing the cumulative growth of cyclically sensitive economic indicators four quarters into the future.
Consumption growth is the main exception to this general result—there are no gains in predictive
accuracy relative to our benchmark for this measure of economic activity.
When we omit the credit spread indexes from the predictor set and redo the analysis, we
obtain the standard result, namely, that the predictive accuracy of the BMA method—like that
of most other documented forecasting methods—is statistically indistinguishable from that of the
univariate autoregressive benchmark. This result indicates that there is something diﬀerent about
the information content of credit spreads and that our BMA weighting scheme is able to pick out
this diﬀerence in real-time from a large number of predictors, all of which were treated equally
ex ante. Indeed, the analysis of the evolution of posterior weights that the BMA scheme assigns to
various variables in the predictor set shows that it is economic downturns that lead to the majority
of the posterior weight being placed on the credit spreads. This ﬁnding suggests that corporate
bond spreads—when properly measured—may be one of the earliest and clearest aggregators of
accumulating evidence of incipient recession.
Lastly, we examine the predictive power of the BMA model during the recent ﬁnancial crisis.
While the blowout in credit spreads following the collapse of Lehman Brothers in the early autumn
of 2008 is ingrained in the minds of ﬁnancial market participants, the standard macro predictions did
not anticipate the severe slump in economic activity that ultimately transpired until about the end
of 2008. Thus, it is seems reasonable to expect that a forecast incorporating the information content
of credit spreads is likely to signal a very bad economic outcome before many standard models and
forecasters. In fact, when we examine our real-time forecasts, we ﬁnd that they predicted the
downturn earlier than many standard macroeconomic forecasts. Nevertheless, our BMA forecasts
still underestimated the severity of the downturn, a ﬁnding that is perhaps not too surprising given
the extraordinary economic and ﬁnancial turmoil surrounding that period.
The plan for the remainder of this paper is as follows. Section 2 describes our bond-level data
and the construction of portfolios based on the option-adjusted credit spreads. In Section 3, we
outline the econometric methodology used to combine forecasts by BMA. Section 4 contains our
main empirical results. Section 5 concludes.
32 Data Sources and Methods
2.1 Credit Spreads
The key information for our analysis comes from a large sample of ﬁxed income securities issued by
U.S. corporations. Speciﬁcally, from the Lehman/Warga (LW) and Merrill Lynch (ML) databases,
we extracted month-end prices of outstanding long-term corporate bonds that were actively traded
in the secondary market between January 1986 and June 2010.3 To guarantee that we are measuring
borrowing costs of diﬀerent ﬁrms at the same point in their capital structure, we restricted our
sample to senior unsecured issues with a ﬁxed coupon schedule only. For such securities, we spliced
their month-end prices across the two data sources.
The micro-level aspect of our data set allows us to construct credit spreads that are not contam-
inated by the maturity/duration mismatch that plagues most commercially-available credit spread
indexes. In particular, we construct for each individual bond issue a theoretical risk-free security
that replicates exactly the promised cash-ﬂows of the corresponding corporate debt instrument.
For example, consider a corporate bond k issued by ﬁrm i that at time t is promising a sequence of
cash-ﬂows {C(s) : s = 1,2,...,S}, consisting of the regular coupon payments and the repayment





where D(t) = e−rtt is the discount function in period t. To calculate the price of a corresponding
risk-free security—denoted by P
f
t [k]—we discount the promised cash-ﬂow sequence {C(s) : s =
1,2,...,S} using continuously-compounded zero-coupon Treasury yields in period t, obtained from
the daily estimates of the U.S. Treasury yield curve reported by G¨ urkaynak et al. [2007]. The
resulting price P
f
t [k] can then be used to calculate the yield—denoted by y
f
t [k]—of a hypothetical
Treasury security with exactly the same cash-ﬂows as the underlying corporate bond. The credit
spread Sit[k] = yit[k] − y
f
t [k], where yit[k] denotes the yield of the corporate bond k, is thus free
of the “duration mismatch” that would occur were the spreads computed simply by matching the
corporate yield to the estimated yield of a zero-coupon Treasury security of the same maturity.
To ensure that our results are not driven by a small number of extreme observations, we elim-
inated all bond/month observations with credit spreads below 5 basis points and with spreads
greater than 3,500 basis points. In addition, we dropped from our sample very small corporate
issues—those with a par value of less than $1 million—and all observations with a remaining term-
3These two data sources are used to construct benchmark corporate bond indexes used by market participants.
Speciﬁcally, they contain secondary market prices for a vast majority of dollar-denominated bonds publicly issued
in the U.S. corporate cash market. The ML database is a proprietary data source of daily bond prices that starts
in 1997. The LW database of month-end bond prices is available from 1973 through mid-1998 (see Warga [1991] for
details).
4Table 1: Corporate Bond Characteristics by Type of Firm
Nonﬁnancial Firms
Bond Characteristics Mean SD Min P50 Max
No. of bonds per ﬁrm/month 3.08 3.75 1.00 2.00 74.0
Mkt. value of issue ($mil.) 334.7 327.6 1.22 248.3 5,628
Maturity at issue (years) 12.9 9.3 1.0 10.0 50.0
Term to maturity (years) 10.5 8.4 1.0 7.5 30.0
Duration (years) 6.29 3.26 0.91 5.75 15.8
Credit rating (S&P) - - D BBB1 AAA
Coupon rate (pct.) 7.30 1.97 1.70 7.00 17.5
Nominal yield to maturity (pct.) 7.29 3.04 0.60 6.93 44.3
Credit spread (bps.) 215 297 5 123 3,499
Financial Firms
Bond Characteristic Mean SD Min P50 Max
No. of bonds per ﬁrm/month 3.03 3.49 1.00 2.00 26.0
Mkt. value of issue ($mil.) 471.0 554.9 9.11 266.1 4,351
Maturity at issue (years) 10.4 8.0 2.0 10.0 40.0
Term to maturity (years) 8.5 7.7 1.0 5.9 30.0
Duration (years) 5.47 3.17 0.90 4.77 15.3
Credit rating (S&P) - - CC A2 AAA
Coupon rate (pct.) 6.89 1.94 2.25 6.63 15.8
Nominal yield to maturity (pct.) 6.72 2.73 1.01 6.40 41.2
Credit spread (bps.) 173 254 5 102 3,495
Note: Sample period: Jan1986–June2010. No. of nonﬁnancial ﬁrms/bonds = 1,104/5,896 (Obs.
= 305,412); No. of ﬁnancial ﬁrms/bonds = 193/886 (Obs. = 42,270). The market value of the bond
issues is deﬂated by the CPI (1982–84 = 100). Sample statistics are based on trimmed data (see text
for details).
to-maturity of less than one year or more than 30 years.4 These selection criteria yielded a sample
of 5,896 individual securities issued by ﬁrms in the nonﬁnancial sector and 886 securities issued by
ﬁnancial ﬁrms.5 We matched these corporate securities with their issuer’s quarterly income and
balance sheet data from Compustat and daily data on equity valuations from CRSP, yielding a
matched sample of 1,104 nonﬁnancial ﬁrms and 193 ﬁnancial ﬁrms.
Table 1 contains summary statistics for the key characteristics of bonds in our sample by the
type of ﬁrm (nonﬁnancial vs. ﬁnancial). Note that a typical ﬁrm has only a few senior unsecured
4We also eliminated a very small number of puttable bonds from our sample. In contrast, a signiﬁcant fraction of
the securities in our sample is callable, which raises an important issue of how to separate time-varying prepayment
risk from the default risk premium. We address this issue in detail later in the paper.
5Government-sponsored entities, such as Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, were excluded from the sample.
5issues outstanding at any point in time—the median ﬁrm in both sectors, for example, has two such
issues trading at any given month. The size of bond issues, measured by their market value, tend
to be somewhat larger, on average, in the ﬁnancial sector. Not surprisingly, the maturity of these
debt instruments is fairly long, with the average maturity at issue of more than 10 years in both
sectors. Because corporate bonds typically generate signiﬁcant cash ﬂow in the form of regular
coupon payments, their eﬀective duration is considerably shorter.
According to the S&P credit ratings, our sample spans the entire spectrum of credit quality,
from “single D” to “triple A.” At A2, the median bond/month observation in the ﬁnancial sector
is somewhat above that in the nonﬁnancial sector (i.e., BBB1), though they are both solidly in the
investment-grade category. Turning to returns, the (nominal) coupon rate on the bonds issued by
nonﬁnancial ﬁrms averaged 7.30 percent during our sample period, compared with 6.89 percent for
bonds issued by their ﬁnancial counterparts. The average expected total return was 7.29 percent per
annum in the nonﬁnancial sector and 6.72 percent in the ﬁnancial sector. Relative to Treasuries, an
average bond issued by a nonﬁnancial ﬁrm has an expected return of about 215 basis points above
the comparable risk-free rate. Reﬂecting their generally higher credit quality—at least as perceived
by the ratings agencies—the average credit spread on a bond issued by a ﬁnancial intermediary is
173 basis points.
2.2 Default Risk
The measurement of ﬁrm-speciﬁc default risk is the crucial input in the construction of our bond
portfolios. To measure an issuer’s probability of default at each point in time, we employ the
“distance-to-default” (DD) framework developed in the seminal work of Merton [1973, 1974]. The
key insight of this contingent claims approach to corporate credit risk is that the equity of the ﬁrm
can be viewed as a call option on the underlying value of the ﬁrm with a strike price equal to the
face value of the ﬁrm’s debt. Although neither the underlying value of the ﬁrm nor its volatility
is directly observable, they can, under the assumptions of the model, be inferred from the value of
the ﬁrm’s equity, the volatility of its equity, and the ﬁrm’s observed capital structure.
The procedure used to construct our market-based measure of default risk is described in detail
by Bharath and Shumway [2008] and Gilchrist and Zakrajˇ sek [2010]. Employing this methodology,
we calculate the distance-to-default for all U.S. corporations covered by S&P’s Compustat and
CRSP (i.e., 14,446 ﬁrms over the Jan1986–June2010 period). Figure 1 plots the cross-sectional
median of the DDs for the 1,104 nonﬁnancial and 193 ﬁnancial bond issuers in our sample. As a
point of comparison, the ﬁgure also depicts the cross-sectional interquartile range (IQR) of the DDs
for the entire Compustat-CRSP matched sample.6 According to this metric, the credit quality of
the median nonﬁnancial bond issuer in our sample is, on average, higher than that of the median
6To ensure that our results were not driven by a small number of extreme observations, we eliminated from our
sample all ﬁrm/month observations with a DD of more than 20 or less than -2, cutoﬀs corresponding roughly to the
99th and 1st percentiles of the DD distribution, respectively.
6Figure 1: Distance-to-Default
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Note: Sample period: Jan1986–June2010. The solid line depicts the weighted median DD of the 1,104
nonﬁnancial bond issuers in our sample; the dotted line depicts the weighted median DD of the 193 ﬁnancial
bond issuers. The shaded band depicts the weighted interquartile range of the DDs for the entire U.S. corporate
sector; all percentiles are weighted by the ﬁrm’s outstanding liabilities. The shaded vertical bars represent the
NBER-dated recessions.
ﬁnancial issuer, a result that is primarily due to the fact that ﬁnancial ﬁrms tend to have higher
leverage than their nonﬁnancial counterparts. More importantly, the median DD for both sets of
ﬁrms is strongly procyclical, implying that market participants anticipate corporate defaults to
increase during economic downturns. Indeed, during the height of the recent ﬁnancial crisis in the
autumn of 2008, both measures fell to very low levels by recent historical standards.
2.3 Call-Option Adjustment
Figure 2 shows the proportion of bonds in our sample that are callable—that is, the issuer has, under
certain pre-speciﬁed conditions, the right to “call” (i.e., redeem) the security prior to its maturity.
The share of senior unsecured bonds with embedded call options is, on average, substantial in both
sectors.7 Moreover, the proportion of callable debt has changed considerably over the course of our
sample period, with almost all bonds being subject to a call provision at the start of our sample.
In the late 1980s, however, the composition of debt began to shift noticeably toward noncallable
7The proportions and the U-pattern of the two series are virtually the same if the shares are weighted by the
amount issued.
7Figure 2: Proportion of Callable Corporate Bonds
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Note: Sample period: Jan1986–June2010. The ﬁgure depicts the proportion of bonds in our sample that
are callable. The shaded vertical bars represent the NBER-dated recessions.
debt, and by the mid-1990s, the majority of senior unsecured debt traded in the secondary market
was in the form of noncallable securities. Over the past decade or so, this trend has been reversed,
as ﬁrms resumed issuing large amounts of callable long-term debt.
As shown by Duﬀee [1998], if a ﬁrm’s outstanding bonds are callable, movements in the risk-
free rates—by changing the value of the embedded call option—will have an independent eﬀect on
bond prices, complicating the interpretation of the behavior of credit spreads. For example, as the
general level of interest rates in the economy increases, the option to call becomes less valuable,
which accentuates the price response of callable bonds relative to that of noncallable bonds. As
a result, a rise in interest rates will, ceteris paribus, compress the credit spreads of callable bonds
more than the credit spreads of their noncallable counterparts. In addition, prices of callable bonds
are more sensitive to uncertainty regarding the future course of interest rates. On the other hand,
to the extent that callable bonds are, in eﬀect, of shorter duration, they may be less sensitive to
changes in default risk.
To deal with this issue, we utilize the micro-level aspect of our bond data to adjust directly for
the value of embedded options in callable bonds. In particular, we consider the following empirical
8pricing model for credit spreads:
lnSit[k] = (1 + CALLi[k]) × (α + β1DDit + β2DD2
it + γ′Xit[k])
+ CALLi[k] × (θ1LEVt + θ2SLPt + θ3CRVt + θ4VOLt) + RTGit[k] + ǫit[k], (1)
where CALLi[k] is an indicator variable that equals one if bond k (issued by ﬁrm i) is callable and
zero otherwise, DDit denotes the estimated year-ahead distance-to-default for ﬁrm i, and ǫit[k] is
a “bond-pricing error.”8 In this framework, the credit spreads of callable bonds are allowed to
depend separately on the level (LEVt), slope (SLPt), and curvature (CRVt) of the Treasury yield
curve, the three factors that summarize the vast majority of the information in the Treasury term
structure, according to Litterman and Scheinkman [1991] and Chen and Scott [1993].9 The spreads
of callable bonds are also inﬂuenced by the uncertainty regarding the path of long-term interest
rates, as measured by the option-implied volatility on the 30-year Treasury bond futures (VOLt).
We also allow for a nonlinear eﬀect of default risk on credit spreads by including a quadratic
term of DDit in the pricing regression, thereby accounting for the nonlinear relationship between
credit spreads and leverage documented by Levin et al. [2004].10 The vector Xit[k], in contrast,
controls for the bond-speciﬁc characteristics that could inﬂuence credit spreads through either
term or liquidity premiums, including the bond’s duration (lnDURit[k]), the amount outstanding
(lnPARit[k]), and the bond’s (ﬁxed) coupon rate (lnCPNi[k]). The regression also includes credit
rating ﬁxed eﬀects (RTGit[k]), which capture the “soft information” regarding the ﬁrm’s ﬁnancial
health, information that is complementary to our market-based measures of default risk; see, for
example, L¨ oﬄer [2004, 2007].
We estimate the pricing regression (1) separately for the sample of securities issued by nonﬁ-
nancial ﬁrms and those issued by ﬁnancial ﬁrms. Neglecting the eﬀect of Jensen’s inequality, the
option-adjusted spread on a callable bond k (i.e., CALLi[k] = 1)—denoted by ˜ Sit[k]—is given by
˜ Sit[k] = exp
h
lnSit[k] − CALLi[k] × (ˆ α + ˆ β1DDit + ˆ β2DD2
it + ˆ γ′Xit[k])
− (ˆ θ1LEVt + ˆ θ2SLPt + ˆ θ3CRVt + ˆ θ4VOLt)
i
,
where ˆ α, ˆ β1, ˆ β2, ˆ γ, and ˆ θ1,..., ˆ θ4 denote the OLS estimates of the corresponding parameters from
equation (1).
8Taking logs of credit spreads provides a useful transformation to control for heteroscedasticity, given that the
distribution of credit spreads is highly skewed.
9The level, slope, and curvature factors correspond, respectively, to the ﬁrst three principal components of nominal
Treasury yields at 3-month, 6-month, 1-, 2-, 3-, 5-, 7-, 10-, 15-, and 30-year maturities. All yield series are monthly
(at month-end) and with the exception of the 3- and 6-month bill rates are derived from the smoothed Treasury yield
curve estimated by G¨ urkaynak et al. [2007].
10As a robustness check, we also considered higher-order polynomials of the distance-to-default, but the inclusion
of cubic and quartic terms had virtually no eﬀect on our results.
9Table 2: Selected Marginal Eﬀects by Type of Bond
Nonﬁnancial Firmsa Financial Firmsb
Marginal Eﬀect CALL = 0 CALL = 1 CALL = 0 CALL = 1
Distance-to-default: DDit -0.227 -0.138 -0.123 -0.133
(0.013) (0.009) (0.029) 0.016
Term structure: LEVt - -0.508 - -0.480
(0.045) (0.082)
Term structure: SLPt - -0.319 - -0.245
(0.039) (0.052)
Term structure: CRVt - -0.052 - -0.086
(0.044) (0.042)
Term structure: VOLt - 0.153 - 0.147
(0.014) (0.017)
Adjusted R2 0.730 0.594
Pr > Wc 0.000 0.000
Note: Sample period: Jan1986–Jun2010. Entries in the table denote the estimated marginal
eﬀects of a one unit change in the speciﬁed variable on the level of credit spreads (in percentage points)
for noncallable (CALL = 0) and callable (CALL = 1) bonds based on the bond-pricing regression (1).
All marginal eﬀects are evaluated at their respective sample means (not reported). Robust asymptotic
standard errors reported in parentheses are double clustered in the ﬁrm (i) and time (t) dimensions;
see Cameron et al. [2010] for details.
aNo. of ﬁrms/bonds = 1,104/5,896; Obs. = 305,412.
bNo. of ﬁrms/bonds = 193/886; Obs. = 42,270.
cp-value for the robust Wald test of the exclusion of credit rating ﬁxed eﬀects.
Table 2 translates the selected coeﬃcients from the estimated log-spread pricing equation into
the impact of variation in default risk (the sum of the linear and quadratic DD terms), the shape of
the term structure, and interest rate uncertainty on the level of credit spreads. For callable bonds
issued by nonﬁnancial ﬁrms, the eﬀect of the distance-to-default on credit spreads is signiﬁcantly
attenuated by the call-option mechanism: A one standard deviation increase in the distance-to-
default—a signal of improving credit quality—implies a decrease of 23 basis points in the spreads
of noncallable bonds, compared with a 14 basis points decline in the spreads of their callable
counterparts. The same call-option mechanism, however, does not seem to be as important for
bonds issued by ﬁnancial intermediaries. In that case, a one standard deviation increase in the
distance-to-default implies a narrowing of spreads of about 13 basis points for both types of bonds.
The estimates in Table 2 also indicate that the shape of the Treasury term structure and
interest rate volatility have ﬁrst-order eﬀects on the credit spreads of callable bonds, which are
consistent with the theoretical predictions. For example, a one standard deviation increase in the
level factor implies a 50 basis points reduction in the credit spreads on callable bonds in both sectors.
10Figure 3: Credit Spreads on Corporate Bonds




























Note: Sample period: Jan1986–June2010. The solid line in each panel depicts the time-series of the weighted
cross-sectional average of the option-adjusted credit spreads for our sample of bonds (see text for details); the
dotted line depicts the time-series of the weighted cross-sectional average of the raw credit spreads. In all cases,
the weights are equal to the market values of the underlying bond issues. The shaded vertical bars represent the
NBER-dated recessions.
Similarly, an increase in the option-implied volatility on the long-term Treasury bond futures of
one percentage point implies a widening of callable credit spreads of about 15 basis points, because
the rise in interest rate uncertainty lowers the prices of callable bonds by boosting the value of the
embedded call options.
The importance of the option-adjustment procedure over the entire sample period is illustrated
in Figure 3, which shows the time path of the average credit spread in our two data sets, calculated
using both the raw and option-adjusted spreads. Although the two series in each sector are clearly
highly correlated (ρ = 0.88 for nonﬁnancial issuers and ρ = 0.92 for ﬁnancial issuers) and are all
11strongly countercyclical, there are a number of noticeable diﬀerences. First, the option-adjusted
credit spreads are, on average, lower than their unadjusted counterparts, reﬂecting the positive value
of the embedded call options. By eliminating, at least in part, ﬂuctuations in the call option values,
the option-adjusted credit spreads are also less volatile, on average, than the raw credit spreads.
Lastly, the largest diﬀerences between the two series occurred in the mid-1980s and during the
recent ﬁnancial crisis. The former period was characterized by a high general level of interest rates
and relatively high uncertainty regarding the future course of long-term interest rates, whereas the
diﬀerence during the latter period owes primarily to the plunge in interest rates and the steepening
of the term structure that began with the onset of the ﬁnancial crisis in the summer of 2007, two
factors than more than oﬀset the spike in interest rate volatility that occurred during that period.
2.4 Distance-to-Default Portfolios
We summarize the information contained in credit spreads, DDs, and excess equity returns for the
sample of bond issuers by constructing portfolios based on expected default risk—as measured by
our estimate of the distance-to-default—at the beginning of the period. These conditional DD-
based portfolios are constructed by sorting the three ﬁnancial indicators in month t into bins based
on the percentiles of the distribution of the distance-to-default in month t − 1. Separate portfolios
are formed for the ﬁnancial and nonﬁnancial issuers.
The distance-to-default portfolios are constructed by computing a weighted average of DDs in
month t for each bin, with the weights equal to the book value of the ﬁrm’s liabilities at the end
of month t−1. Similarly, the stock portfolios are computed as a weighted average of excess equity
returns in month t for each bin, with the weights equal to the market value of the ﬁrm’s equity
at the end of month t − 1.11 Given the relatively large number of nonﬁnancial issuers, the bins
for nonﬁnancial portfolios are based on the quartiles of the DD distribution, yielding four credit-
risk categories, denoted by NFIN-DD1, NFIN-DD2, NFIN-DD3, and NFIN-DD4. The ﬁnancial
bond issuers, by contrast, are sorted into two credit-risk categories—denoted by FIN-DD1 and
FIN-DD2—based on the median of the DD distribution.
To control for maturity, we further split each DD-based bin of nonﬁnancial credit spreads into
four maturity categories: (1) NFIN-MTY1: credit spreads of bonds with the remaining term-
to-maturity of more than 1 year but less than (or equal) to 5 years; (2) NFIN-MTY2: credit
spreads of bonds with the remaining term-to-maturity of more than 5 years but less than (or equal)
10 years; (3) NFIN-MTY3: credit spreads of bonds with the remaining term-to-maturity of more
than 10 years but less than (or equal) to 15 years; (4) NFIN-MTY4: credit spreads of bonds with
the remaining term-to-maturity of more than 15 years. Given the substantially smaller sample of
bonds issued by ﬁrms in the ﬁnancial sector, we split the two credit-risk categories in this sector
11Excess equity returns, which include dividends and capital gains, are measured relative to the yield on 1-month
Treasury bills.
12into two maturity categories: (1) FIN-MTY1: credit spreads of bonds with the remaining term-to-
maturity of more than 1 year but less than (or equal) to 5 years; and (2) FIN-MTY2: credit spreads
of bonds with the remaining term-to-maturity of more than 5 years. All told, this gives us a total
of 16 nonﬁnancial and 4 ﬁnancial DD/maturity bond portfolios. Within each of these portfolios, we
compute a weighted average of option-adjusted credit spreads in month t, with the weights equal
to the market value of the outstanding issue. (The summary statistics of all DD-based portfolios
are contained in Appendix A.)
The DD-based portfolios considered thus far were based on asset prices of a subset of U.S.
corporations, namely ﬁrms with senior unsecured bonds that are traded in the secondary market.
We also consider a broader set of DD-based ﬁnancial indicators by constructing the same type of
portfolios using the distance-to-default estimates and excess equity returns for the entire matched
CRSP-Compustat sample of U.S. corporations. Given the large number of ﬁrms in any given month,
we increase the number of bins by sorting—for both nonﬁnancial and ﬁnancial ﬁrms separately—
the DDs and excess equity returns in month t into 10 deciles based on the distribution of the
distance-to-default in month t − 1. As before, the conditional DD portfolios are constructed by
computing a weighted average of DDs in month t for each DD decile, whereas the stock portfolios
are computed as a weighted average of excess equity returns in month t. This procedure yields a
total of 20 additional DD-based portfolios for the nonﬁnancial sector and another 20 portfolios for
the ﬁnancial sector.
3 Econometric Methodology
We examine the predictive content of the DD-based portfolios, as well as a large number of other pre-
dictors, within the Bayesian Model Averaging (BMA) framework, an approach that is particularly
well-suited to deal with model uncertainty. Initially proposed by Leamer [1978], BMA has been used
extensively in the statistics literature; see, for example, Raftery et al. [1997] and Chipman et al.
[2001]. The BMA approach to model uncertainty has also found numerous econometric applica-
tions, including the forecasting of output growth (Min and Zellner [1993] and Koop and Potter
[2004]); the forecasting of recession risk (King et al. [2007]); cross-country growth regressions
(Fernandez et al. [2001b] and Sala-i-Martin et al. [2004]); exchange rate forecasting (Wright [2008]);
and the predictability of stock returns (Avramov [2002] and Cremers [2002]).
3.1 Bayesian Model Averaging
We begin with a brief review of the formal Bayesian justiﬁcation for our model-averaging approach.
The researcher starts with a set of n possible models, where the i-th model, denoted by Mi, is
parametrized by θi. The researcher has prior beliefs about the probability that the i-th model
is true—denoted by P(Mi)—observes data D, and updates her beliefs to compute the posterior










is the marginal likelihood of the i-th model; P(θi|Mi) is the prior density of the parameter vector
θi associated with the i-th model; and P(D|θi,Mi) is the likelihood function.
Each model also implies a forecast. In the presence of model uncertainty, the BMA forecast
weights each of the individual forecasts by their respective posterior probabilities. To operationalize
a BMA forecasting scheme, the researcher needs only to specify the set of models, the model priors
P(Mi), and the parameter priors P(θi|Mi). In this paper, we follow a growing literature that
considers a large set of very simple models. In particular, the models are all linear regression
models, with each model adding a single regressor to the baseline speciﬁcation. More formally, the
i-th model is given by
yt+h = βiXit + γ′Zt + ǫt+h, (4)
where yt is the variable that the researcher wishes to forecast at a horizon of h periods; Xit is the
predictor speciﬁc to model i; Zt is a (p×1)-vector of predictors that are common to all models; and
ǫt+h
iid ∼ N(0,σ2) is the forecast error. Without loss of generality, the model-speciﬁc predictor Xit
is assumed to be orthogonal to the common predictors Zt. In our setup, the vector of parameters
characterizing the i-th model is thus given by θi = (βi γ′ σ2)′.
In setting the model priors, we assume that all models are equally likely, implying that P(Mi) =
1/n. For the parameter priors, we follow the general trend of the BMA literature (e.g., Fernandez et al.
[2001a]) in specifying that the prior for γ and σ2, denoted by p(γ,σ), is uninformative and is pro-
portional to 1/σ, while using the g-prior speciﬁcation of Zellner [1986] for βi conditional on σ2.
The g-prior is given by N(0,φσ2(X′
iXi)−1), where the shrinkage hyperparameter φ > 0 measures
the strength of the prior—a smaller value of φ corresponds to a more dogmatic prior.
Letting ˆ βi and ˆ γ denote the OLS estimates of the corresponding parameters in equation (4),
the Bayesian h-period-ahead forecast made from model Mi at time T is given by
˜ yi
T+h|T = ˜ βiXit + ˆ γ′Zt, (5)





ˆ βi denotes the posterior mean of βi. In our framework, the marginal likelihood



















14where SSRi is the sum of squares from the i-th the regression and SSEi is the associated sum of
squared errors. The posterior probabilities of the models can then be worked out from equation (2),






Clearly, the BMA forecast in equation (7) will depend on the value of the shrinkage hyperpa-
rameter φ. A small value of φ implies that the model likelihoods are roughly equal, and so the BMA
forecast will resemble equal-weighted model averaging (cf. Bates and Granger [1969]). In contrast,
a high value of φ amounts to weighting the models by their in-sample R2 values, a procedure that
is well known to generate poor out-of-sample forecasting performance. Because the relationship be-
tween the out-of-sample root mean square prediction error and the parameter φ is often U-shaped,
the best out-of-sample forecasts are obtained when φ is neither too small nor too big. Our baseline
results are based on a standard value (φ = 4) taken from the aforementioned literature, but we
also conduct sensitivity analysis, which shows that our key results are robust with respect to this
choice.
We apply BMA to forecasting various indicators of economic activity using standard macroeco-
nomic variables and ﬁnancial asset prices as predictors. The common predictors Zt in the predictive
regression (4) are a constant and lags of the dependent variable. It is worth emphasizing that we
view the forecasting scheme proposed above as a pragmatic approach to data-based weighting of
models and make no claim to its Bayesian optimality properties.12
3.2 The Forecasting Setup
We focus on forecasting real GDP, real personal consumption expenditures (PCE), real business
ﬁxed investment, industrial production, private payroll employment, the civilian unemployment
rate, exports, and imports over the period from 1986:Q1 to 2010:Q2. All series are in quarter-over-
quarter growth rates (actually 400 times log ﬁrst diﬀerences), except for the unemployment rate,
which is simply in ﬁrst diﬀerences. Our objective is to forecast the cumulative growth rate (or the
cumulative change in the case of the unemployment rate) for each of these macroeconomic variables
from quarter t − 1 through quarter t + h.
Speciﬁcally, let yt denote the growth rate in the variable from quarter t − 1 to quarter t. (In
12As noted by a number of papers that employ the same data-based model averaging approach, several of the
conditions for strict optimality are not met in typical macro time-series applications. First, the regressors are
assumed to be strictly exogenous. And second, the forecasts are overlapping h-step ahead forecasts, so the forecast
errors less than h periods apart are bound to be serially correlated, even though it is assumed that they are i.i.d.
normal. Nevertheless, BMA, like other methods that combine a large number of predictors to generate a forecast,
may still have good forecasting properties, even if the premises underlying their theoretical justiﬁcation are false
(e.g., Stock and Watson [2005]). In fact, ability to provide accurate out-of-sample forecasts is a stringent test of the
practical usefulness of BMA in forecasting.
15case of the unemployment rate, yt denotes the ﬁrst diﬀerence.) The average value of yt over the









t+h = α + βixit +
p X
j=1
γjyt−j + ǫt+h, (8)
where xit is one of the predictors listed in Table 3 and p, the number of lags, is determined by
the Bayes Information Criterion (BIC). The set of possible predictors listed in Table 3 includes
15 diﬀerent macroeconomic series and 110 ﬁnancial indicators. The ﬁnancial indicators include
our 20 bond portfolios of option-adjusted credit spreads, as well as average DDs and excess equity
returns for diﬀerent default-risk portfolios; in addition, we consider the predictive content of the
three Fama-French risk factors (i.e., the excess market return and the SMB and HML factors), a
range of standard interest rates and interest rate spreads, implied volatilities from options quotes,
commodity prices, and conventional credit spreads.
The timing convention in the forecasting regression (8) is as follows. We think of forecasts
as being made in the middle month of each quarter. For macroeconomic variables, we use the
February, May, August, and November vintages of data from the real-time data set compiled and
maintained by the Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia; this includes data through the previous
quarter for all the macroeconomic series that we consider. All asset prices are as of the end of the
month from the ﬁrst month of the current quarter and would have been available as of the middle
month of the quarter.
The option-adjustment procedure is also implemented in real-time—that is, the parameters of
the pricing regression (1) are estimated each month using only data available at that time. The
resulting real-time coeﬃcient estimates are used to compute the option-adjusted credit spreads,
which are then sorted into the DD-based bond portfolios.13 With these fully real-time data in
hand, we then use BMA to construct forecasts of the values of the dependent variable for the
current and next four quarters (i.e., h = 0,1,...,4). Thus, we are considering both “nowcasting”
and prediction at horizons up to one year ahead. These forecasts are evaluated in a recursive out-
of-sample forecast evaluation exercise, starting with the forecasts made in 1992:Q1 and continuing
through to the end of the sample period in 2010:Q2.
An important issue in this type of real-time forecasting exercise is the deﬁnition of what con-
stitutes the “actual” values with which to compare the BMA forecasts. The macroeconomic series
that we are forecasting are subject to benchmark revisions, and some of the series are also sub-
ject to deﬁnitional and conceptual changes. None of these changes seem sensible to predict in a
real-time forecasting exercise. Accordingly, we follow a standard convention (cf. Tulip [2005]; and
Faust and Wright [2009]), which is to measure actual realized values from the data as recorded in
13Note that the real-time implementation of the option-adjustment procedure generates spreads that diﬀer from
the option-adjusted spreads underlying Figure 3, where the option-adjustment procedure was implemented using the
full data set.
16Table 3: Macroeconomic and Financial Predictors




PCE (durable goods) log diﬀerence
Residential investment log diﬀerence
Business ﬁxed investment log diﬀerence
Government spending log diﬀerence
Exports log diﬀerence
Imports log diﬀerence
Nonfarm private payrolls log diﬀerence
Civilian unemployment rate diﬀerence
Industrial production log diﬀerence
Single-family housing starts log diﬀerence
GDP price deﬂator log diﬀerence
Consumer price index log diﬀerence
M2 log diﬀerence
Financial Indicators (110)
Credit spreads in DD-based bond portfolios (nonﬁnancial) (16) level
Credit spreads in DD-based bond portfolios (ﬁnancial) (4) level
Avg. DD by DD percentile (nonﬁnancial bond issuers) (4) level
Avg. DD by DD percentile (nonﬁnancial ﬁrms) (10) level
Excess stock returns by DD percentile (nonﬁnancial bond issuers) (4) level
Excess stock returns by DD percentile (nonﬁnancial ﬁrms) (10) level
Avg. DD by DD percentile (ﬁnancial bond issuers) (2) level
Avg. DD by DD percentile (ﬁnancial ﬁrms) (10) level
Excess stock returns by DD percentile (ﬁnancial bond issuers) (2) level
Excess stock returns by DD percentile (ﬁnancial ﬁrms) (10) level
3-month nonﬁnancial commercial paper rate level
3-month nonﬁnancial commercial paper rate less 3-month Tbill rate
3-month Eurodollar rate level
3-month Eurodollar rate less 3-month Tbill rate
3-month Treasury bill rate level
Federal funds rate level
1- to 10-year Treasury yields
a (10) level
1- to 10-year Treasury yields (10) less 3-month Tbill rate
Fama-French risk factors (3) level
S&P 100 futures implied volatility (VXO) level
Treasury futures implied volatility (10 and 30 year) level
Eurodollar futures implied volatility (3-month) level
Gold price 2nd diﬀerence of logs
Oil price 2nd diﬀerence of logs
CRB commodity price index 2nd diﬀerence of logs
S&P 500 dividend yield log
Moody’s Baa-Aaa credit spread level
Note: All macroeconomic series come from the real-time data set maintained by the Federal Reserve
Bank of Philadelphia. The NIPA series are in real terms (c-w, $2000).
aThe nominal Treasury yields between maturities of 1- and 10-years are taken from the Treasury yield
curve estimated by G¨ urkaynak, Sack, and Wright [2007]
17the real-time data set by the Philadelphia Fed two quarters after the quarter to which the data
refer.
3.3 Inference
The accuracy of the BMA forecasts is evaluated by comparing the mean-square prediction error
(MSPE) of the BMA forecast to that obtained from a univariate autoregression:14
y
C
t+h = α +
p X
j=1
γjyt−j + ǫt+h. (9)
Unfortunately, evaluating the statistical signiﬁcance of the diﬀerence in MSPEs from BMA and the
direct autoregression is complicated by the fact that the forecasts are generated by nested models.
As shown by Clark and McCracken [2001], the distribution of the Diebold and Mariano [1995] test
statistic under the null hypothesis of equal forecast accuracy has a nonstandard distribution in
this case. Accordingly, we use a bootstrap to approximate the limiting distribution of the Diebold-
Mariano statistic under the null hypothesis. In the bootstrap, the predictors are, by construction,
irrelevant—nevertheless, they have time-series and cross-sectional dependence properties that are
designed to mimic those of the underlying data. The bootstrap hence allows us to test the null
hypothesis of no improvement in forecast accuracy.
We consider two speciﬁc bootstrap re-sampling schemes to implement this idea. The ﬁrst
implementation of the bootstrap, henceforth referred to as bootstrap B1, involves ﬁtting an AR(4)
process to yt and separately estimating a dynamic factor model using the set of all predictors Xt:
Xt = ΛFt + ut; (10)
and
Ft = ΦFt−1 + vt, (11)
where the elements of the vector Ft correspond to the ﬁrst three principal components of Xt. In each
bootstrap replication, we ﬁrst re-sample with replacement from the residuals of the AR(4) process
for yt to construct bootstrap samples of yt. We then independently re-sample with replacement
from the residuals in equations (10) and (11), thereby constructing bootstrap samples of Xt for
use in BMA; note that in this setup, the predictor set Xt is, by construction, irrelevant for the
forecasting of the dependent variable.
The second implementation of the bootstrap, henceforth referred to as bootstrap B2, follows
Clark and McCracken [2010] and Gon¸ calves and Perron [2010]. Speciﬁcally, we estimate two mod-
14Note that this is a direct autoregression that projects y
C
t+h onto p lags of yt. An alternative would be to estimate
an AR(p) model for yt and then iterate it forward to construct the forecasts. This approach yielded very similar
results.
18els: a restricted model that involves estimating an AR(4) process for yt and an unrestricted model
that consists of a regression of yt on four lags of itself and the ﬁrst three principal components of Xt.
In each bootstrap replication, we then re-sample from the residuals of the unrestricted model using
a wild bootstrap and then construct a bootstrap sample of yt using these re-sampled residuals to-
gether with the coeﬃcients from the restricted model (see Clark and McCracken [2010] for details);
meanwhile, the predictor set Xt is held ﬁxed. As with bootstrap B1, the predictors are again, by
construction, irrelevant for the forecasting of the dependent variable in all samples. Compared with
bootstrap B1, bootstrap B2 has the advantage of preserving any conditional heteroscedasticity in
the data.
4 Results
Table 4 contains the relative out-of-sample MSPEs of the BMA forecasts, using the benchmark
value of the shrinkage parameter φ = 4. Bootstrapped p-values testing the null hypothesis that the
relative mean-square prediction error is equal to 1.0, are shown in round and square brackets for
bootstraps B1 and B2, respectively; as evidenced by the entries in the table, the two p-values are
generally consistent. For real GDP growth, the MSPEs from the BMA forecasts relative to those
from the direct autoregression are around 0.8 at all forecast horizons beyond the current quarter.
Judging from the associated p-values, these improvements in forecast accuracy are all statistically
signiﬁcant, at least at the 5 percent level.
The relative accuracy of BMA in forecasting output growth appears to reﬂect, in part, its ability
to predict the growth of business ﬁxed investment. In addition, BMA also does well in forecasting
the external dimension of U.S. economic performance, namely the growth of both exports and im-
ports. Personal consumption expenditures, in contrast, are considerably less predictable. Although
BMA is noticeably more accurate than the direct autoregression in forecasting consumption growth
over the very near term, the relative MSPEs are statistically indistinguishable from 1.0 at the two-
to four-quarter-ahead horizons.
Our BMA setup also implies economically and statistically signiﬁcant gains in accuracy when
predicting the growth of industrial production and changes in labor market conditions at both the
near- and longer-term forecast horizons. In the case of industrial production, the relative MSPEs
lie between 0.87 and 0.97, improvements that are borderline statistically signiﬁcant. The relative
MSPEs in the case of employment growth and changes in the unemployment rate are mostly around
0.8, values that are all signiﬁcantly below 1.0 at a 5 percent signiﬁcance level.
Overall, our ﬁrst set of results indicates that for forecasting a range of real economic activity
indicators, BMA—with (option-adjusted) portfolio credit spreads in the set of predictors—yields
improvements relative to the univariate benchmark that are both economically and statistically
signiﬁcant. The gains in forecasting accuracy are most pronounced for cyclically sensitive indicators
of economic activity, such as the growth of business ﬁxed investment, industrial production, and
19Table 4: BMA Out-of-Sample Predictive Accuracy
(Predictor Set: All Variables)
Forecast Horizon (h quarters)
Economic Activity Indicator h = 0 h = 1 h = 2 h = 3 h = 4
GDP 0.94 0.82 0.73 0.79 0.85
(0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.03)
[0.04] [0.01] [0.00] [0.02] [0.05]
Personal consumption expenditures 0.79 0.86 0.96 1.07 1.14
(0.00) (0.02) (0.16) (0.61) (0.70)
[0.01] [0.06] [0.16] [0.29] [0.35]
Business ﬁxed investment 0.89 0.70 0.87 0.87 0.86
(0.00) (0.00) (0.02) (0.03) (0.04)
[0.01] [0.00] [0.02] [0.03] [0.03]
Industrial production 0.97 0.95 0.95 0.93 0.87
(0.04) (0.04) (0.07) (0.06) (0.04)
[0.06] [0.06] [0.07] [0.08] [0.06]
Private employment 0.88 0.79 0.83 0.89 0.84
(0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.04) (0.03)
[0.01] [0.00] [0.01] [0.05] [0.03]
Unemployment rate 0.92 0.78 0.73 0.74 0.77
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.02)
[0.01] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.02]
Exports 0.96 0.92 0.88 0.89 0.89
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.05)
[0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.01] [0.02]
Imports 0.91 0.90 0.94 0.91 0.92
(0.00) (0.00) (0.03) (0.03) (0.06)
[0.00] [0.01] [0.05] [0.05] [0.08]
Note: Sample period: 1986:Q1–2010:Q2. The jump-oﬀ date for the out-of-sample recursive forecasts
is 1992:Q1. The forecasted variable is the cumulative growth rate (or change in the case of unemployment
rate) of each economic activity indicator over the speciﬁed forecast horizon. Entries in the table denote
the ratio of the MSPE from the BMA forecast to the MSPE from a direct autoregression. Each model
in the BMA forecast consists of a direct autoregression augmented with one predictor. Bootstrapped
p-values (500 replications) for the test of the null hypothesis that the ratio of the MSPEs is equal to one
are shown in round and square brackets, using bootstraps B1 and B2, respectively (see text for details).
private employment.15
To gauge the information content of credit spreads in predicting economic activity, we repeat
the above analysis, except that we exclude the 20 models that utilize the credit spreads in the
15As a robustness check, we also considered other methods for forecasting in a data-rich environment, includ-
ing a factor-augmented autoregression and an equally-weighted average of OLS-based forecasts. In general, BMA
outperformed these methods.
20Table 5: BMA Out-of-Sample Predictive Accuracy
(Predictor Set: All Variables Except Option-Adjusted Credit Spreads)
Forecast Horizon (h quarters)
Economic Activity Indicator h = 0 h = 1 h = 2 h = 3 h = 4
GDP 0.96 0.95 0.95 0.98 0.98
(0.03) (0.05) (0.08) (0.14) (0.15)
[0.12] [0.11] [0.12] [0.13] [0.14]
Personal consumption expenditures 0.95 0.92 0.99 1.06 1.13
(0.06) (0.06) (0.21) (0.57) (0.68)
[0.12] [0.11] [0.20] [0.32] [0.43]
Business ﬁxed investment 0.90 0.91 0.92 0.96 0.92
(0.00) (0.02) (0.04) (0.11) (0.08)
[0.01] [0.04] [0.07] [0.10] [0.07]
Industrial production 0.98 1.04 1.11 1.11 1.07
(0.07) (0.70) (0.83) (0.72) (0.50)
[0.10] [0.51] [0.63] [0.50] [0.32]
Private employment 0.97 1.00 1.09 1.13 1.07
(0.06) (0.20) (0.72) (0.71) (0.42)
[0.07] [0.23] [0.53] [0.45] [0.24]
Unemployment rate 0.93 0.94 1.04 1.11 1.08
(0.01) (0.03) (0.54) (0.71) (0.55)
[0.01] [0.02] [0.32] [0.47] [0.28]
Exports 0.97 1.05 0.99 0.97 0.97
(0.01) (0.80) (0.15) (0.09) (0.12)
[0.01] [0.59] [0.07] [0.05] [0.07]
Imports 0.91 0.94 1.01 1.08 1.07
(0.00) (0.01) (0.24) (0.53) (0.45)
[0.00] [0.04] [0.16] [0.27] [0.25]
Note: Sample period: 1986:Q1–2010:Q2. The jump-oﬀ date for the out-of-sample recursive forecasts
is 1992:Q1. The forecasted variable is the cumulative growth rate (or change in the case of unemployment
rate) of each economic activity indicator over the speciﬁed forecast horizon. Entries in the table denote
the ratio of the MSPE from the BMA forecast to the MSPE from a direct autoregression. Each model
in the BMA forecast consists of a direct autoregression augmented with one predictor. Bootstrapped
p-values (500 replications) for the test of the null hypothesis that the ratio of the MSPEs is equal to one
are shown in round and square brackets, using bootstraps B1 and B2, respectively (see text for details).
DD-based bond portfolios from the pool of prediction models. As shown in Table 5, very few of
the entries are less than 0.95, and, especially at longer forecast horizons, most entries are greater
than 1.0. This ﬁnding is consistent with the standard result that a majority of forecasting methods
perform about as well as a univariate autoregression. These results also illustrate a sense of how
the information content of our credit spread indexes diﬀers from that of the other real and ﬁnancial
21Table 6: BMA Out-of-Sample Predictive Accuracy
(Predictor Set: Option-Adjusted Credit Spreads Only)
Forecast Horizon (h quarters)
Economic Activity Indicator h = 0 h = 1 h = 2 h = 3 h = 4
GDP 0.88 0.83 0.80 0.89 1.00
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.02) (0.24)
[0.00] [0.00] [0.01] [0.02] [0.06]
Personal consumption expenditures 0.77 0.76 0.92 1.01 1.08
(0.00) (0.00) (0.07) (0.30) (0.66)
[0.00] [0.01] [0.08] [0.16] [0.26]
Business ﬁxed investment 0.84 0.69 0.85 0.85 0.86
(0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.02) (0.03)
[0.00] [0.00] [0.02] [0.02] [0.04]
Industrial production 0.92 0.90 0.94 0.96 0.89
(0.01) (0.01) (0.05) (0.08) (0.04)
[0.02] [0.03] [0.08] [0.10] [0.08]
Private employment 0.85 0.78 0.81 0.84 0.78
(0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02)
[0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.01] [0.01]
Unemployment rate 0.86 0.76 0.69 0.70 0.70
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
[0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00]
Exports 0.96 0.94 0.99 1.07 1.13
(0.01) (0.02) (0.15) (0.68) (0.82)
[0.00] [0.00] [0.01] [0.14] [0.28]
Imports 0.90 0.84 0.84 0.88 0.89
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.02) (0.03)
[0.00] [0.00] [0.02] [0.05] [0.08]
Note: Sample period: 1986:Q1–2010:Q2. The jump-oﬀ date for the out-of-sample recursive forecasts
is 1992:Q1. The forecasted variable is the cumulative growth rate (or change in the case of unemployment
rate) of each economic activity indicator over the speciﬁed forecast horizon. Entries in the table denote
the ratio of the MSPE from the BMA forecast to the MSPE from a direct autoregression. Each model
in the BMA forecast consists of a direct autoregression augmented with one predictor. Bootstrapped
p-values (500 replications) for the test of the null hypothesis that the ratio of the MSPEs is equal to one
are shown in round and square brackets, using bootstraps B1 and B2, respectively (see text for details).
indicators in the predictor set: When assigning the weight to a predictor using only information
available at the time of the forecast, the BMA method singles out portfolio-based credit spreads
and is able to exploit their predictive ability for economic activity to improve signiﬁcantly on the
benchmark forecast.
Another way to highlight the predictive ability of credit spreads is shown in Table 6, which
22contains the results of the forecasting exercise based only on models that include portfolio credit
spreads as predictors. These results are very comparable to those reported in Table 4, which utilize
the information content of the entire predictor set. Although restricting the predictor set to only
DD-based portfolio credit spreads leads to some loss of predictive accuracy for real GDP growth,
it actually improves the accuracy of the BMA forecasts of labor market indicators and business
ﬁxed investment. Because all of our models embed the autoregressive benchmark, the results in
Tables 5–6 together imply that any forecasting gains over the univariate autoregression are, in
general, due to the information content of credit spreads in the DD-based portfolios.
4.1 Which Predictors are the Most Informative?
The vertical bars in Figure 4 depict the ﬁnal total weights—that is, the sum of posterior probabilities—
that BMA assigns to variables in the following predictor subsets: (1) option-adjusted credit spreads
in the DD-based bond portfolios; (2) macroeconomic variables; (3) other interest rates and spreads;
and (4) all other asset market indicators. Results are shown for all the forecast horizons considered
and for each of the eight diﬀerent indicators of economic activity. Note that, by construction, these
probabilities sum up to one at each forecast horizon.
These results provide a visual conﬁrmation of the information content of the option-adjusted
credit spreads in our DD-based bond portfolios. With the exception of consumption growth, BMA
assigns the vast majority of the posterior weight to credit spreads in our DD-based portfolios. But
even in that case, most of the posterior weight for the near-term forecasts of the growth in PCE
(i.e., h = 0,1,2) is assigned to the portfolio credit spreads; at longer horizons (i.e., h = 3,4),
BMA forecasts of consumption growth assign some weight to the macroeconomic variables, but
the accuracy of these forecasts is statistically indistinguishable from those made by the benchmark
autoregression, according to Table 4.
It should be emphasized, however, that Figure 4 shows the posterior probabilities for the dif-
ferent types of predictors as of 2010:Q2, that is, at the end of our sample period. In our real-time
forecasting exercise, these posterior probabilities were updated each time a new forecast was made
and thus, in principle, could have changed over time. Figure 5 illustrates how these probabilities
evolved over time. Speciﬁcally, for each indicator of economic activity, the ﬁgure plots the total
posterior weight attributed to the option-adjusted credit spreads in our 20 DD-based portfolios
against the time that the forecast was made. (For parsimony, we show the posterior probabilities
for the four-quarter-ahead forecast horizon only.)
In line with the speciﬁed prior, forecasts made in the 1990s assigned very little weight to the
portfolio credit spreads. The macroeconomic performance during the 2000–01 cyclical cyclical
downturn led BMA to signiﬁcantly increase—relative to other predictors—the posterior weight on
the portfolio credit spreads, a pattern that was further reinforced by the 2007–09 ﬁnancial crisis.
In fact, by the end of our sample period, BMA assigns the vast majority of the posterior weight
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Note: The ﬁgure depicts the sum of posterior probabilities that BMA assigns to variables in the following
predictor sets: (1) option-adjusted credit spreads in the DD-based bond portfolios; (2) macroeconomic variables;
(3) other interest rates and interest rate spreads; and (4) all other asset market indicators.
24Figure 5: Evolution of BMA Posterior Probabilities for Bond Portfolios
(Four-Quarter-Ahead Forecast Horizon)

















Note: The ﬁgure depicts the real-time evolution of the sum of posterior probabilities that BMA assigns
to the option-adjusted credit spreads in the DD-based bond portfolios. The results shown are for the four-
quarter-ahead forecast horizon (i.e., h = 4). The posterior probabilities for the 20 portfolios—16 in the case
of nonﬁnancial portfolios and four in the case of ﬁnancial portfolios—have been added together. The shaded
vertical bars represent NBER-dated recessions.
to the information content of credit spreads in the DD-based portfolios, a result consistent with
those shown in Figure 4. However, it is important to note that during the 1990s—a portion of the
sample period that is included in the forecast evaluation—the real-time BMA forecasts of economic
activity based on the entire predictor set would have diﬀered markedly from those based only on
the portfolio credit spreads.
The time-series evolution of posterior weights is important because the prediction of cyclical
turning points is of special interest in many forecasting applications. As emphasized by Philippon
[2009], the anticipation of rising defaults associated with economic downturns may make corporate
bond spreads a particularly timely indicator of an incipient recession. The result is also consistent
with the recent work by Gertler and Kiyotaki [2009] and Gertler and Karadi [2010], who introduce
macroeconomic models in which shocks to the value of assets held by ﬁnancial intermediaries—by
reducing the supply of credit—have independent eﬀects on the real economy.
Next, we examine the posterior weights implied by the forecasting exercise shown in Table 5, a
case in which the predictor set includes only the option-adjusted credit spreads in the 20 DD-based
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Note: The ﬁgure depicts the sum of posterior probabilities that BMA assigns to the option-adjusted credit
spreads in the DD-based bond portfolios. The results shown are for the case in which the predictor set includes
only the option-adjusted credit spreads (see Table 5). The posterior probabilities for maturity categories within
each DD bin—four in the case of nonﬁnancial portfolios and two in the case of ﬁnancial portfolios—have been
added together.
26bond portfolios. Figure 6 depicts the total posterior probabilities that BMA assigns to nonﬁnancial
portfolios in each DD quartile (NFIN-DD1, NFIN-DD2, NFIN-DD3, and NFIN-DD4) and the
posterior probabilities assigned to the ﬁnancial portfolios in the two halves of the DD distribution
(FIN-DD1 and FIN-DD2). Results are shown for the one-quarter-ahead and four-quarter-ahead
forecast horizons only. For the ease of presentation, we also summed up the posterior probabilities
across the maturity categories within each DD-based portfolio—by construction, therefore, these
six posterior probabilities must sum to one.
In forecasting economic activity over the subsequent quarter (i.e., h = 1), BMA tends to place
most posterior weight on credit spreads based on portfolios that contain bonds issued by nonﬁnan-
cial ﬁrms. At the four-quarter-ahead forecast horizon, in contrast, the posterior probabilities are
concentrated on credit spreads based on portfolios that contain bonds issued by ﬁnancial ﬁrms in the
lower half of the credit-quality spectrum; though not reported, most of that posterior probability
is assigned to portfolios that contain longer maturity bonds (i.e., FIN-DD1-MTY2).
4.2 Robustness Checks
4.2.1 Varying the Hyperparameter φ
The results reported thus far were based on the value of the shrinkage hyperparameter φ = 4. In this
section, we examine the robustness of our results to diﬀerent values of φ, the parameter governing
the strength of the g-prior. Figure 7 plots the MSPE of the BMA forecast—relative to the MSPE
from a direct autoregression—as a function of φ for all six economic indicators and all ﬁve forecast
horizons. Our BMA forecasting setup delivers substantial gains in forecast accuracy relative to the
direct autoregression for a wide range of values of φ; in fact, the qualitative nature of our results
appears to be fairly insensitive to the choice of the shrinkage parameter. In some cases, the relative
MSPE decreases monotonically in φ (at least over the range of values of φ considered). In others,
the relationship between the MSPE and φ is U-shaped, and the best forecasts are consequently
obtained with a small or intermediate value of φ.
With a suﬃciently small value of φ—implying a very informative prior—BMA outperforms the
univariate time-series benchmark in all cases considered in this paper. This is an attractive feature
of BMA with a suﬃciently informative prior, at least in this data set.16 Overall, setting φ = 4
as our benchmark seems to be a good choice, because it gives relative MSPEs that are less than
one in nearly all cases, and it often yields substantial gains in forecast accuracy. Nevertheless, our
conclusions appear to be quite robust to a wide range of choices of φ.
16Note that in the limit, as φ goes to zero, the BMA forecast is, by construction, equivalent to the forecast from a
direct autoregression.














































































































Note: The ﬁgure depicts the ratio of the MSPE of the BMA forecast to the MSPE from a direct autore-
gression for the diﬀerent values of the shrinkage hyperparameter φ.
284.2.2 Raw vs. Option-Adjusted Credit Spreads
An important feature of our DD-based bond portfolios is that they are based on option-adjusted
credit spreads. As shown in Figure 3, the option-adjustment procedure signiﬁcantly alters the time-
series characteristics of the average credit spread across our 20 bond portfolios; indeed, the real-time
option adjustment makes an even bigger diﬀerence in the case of individual bond portfolios. Thus
one might naturally wonder to what extent our option-adjustment procedure inﬂuences the ability
of credit spreads to forecast economic activity. Accordingly, we re-did our forecasting exercise using
all the predictors as before, except with the DD-based bond portfolios now based on raw credit
spreads, instead of their option-adjusted counterparts. The results of this exercise are shown in
Table 7.
According to entries in the table, the BMA forecasts that use raw credit spreads continue to be
more accurate than the forecasts obtained from direct autoregressions, at least at shorter horizons.
Although gains in forecast accuracy are economically and statistically signiﬁcant in some cases, they
are neither as large nor as consistent—both across economic indicators and horizons—as those that
relied on the option-adjusted credit spreads. For example, in forecasting the growth of private
payroll employment, the BMA forecast that uses the option-adjusted credit spreads is consider-
ably more accurate than the forecast from the direct autoregression at all forecast horizons. But
when raw spreads are used instead, the BMA forecast is actually less accurate than our univariate
benchmark at horizons of two quarters and beyond.
These results suggest that the information content of credit spreads on corporate bonds is
signiﬁcantly inﬂuenced by ﬂuctuations in the values of embedded options, ﬂuctuations that lower
the signal-to-noise ratio of credit spreads for future economic outcomes. Given the fact the standard
credit spread indexes are constructed using prices on both callable and non-callable bonds and that
the portion of callable corporate debt is changing over time, our ﬁndings may also help explain the
uneven forecasting performance of these default-risk indicators for future economic activity.
5 Prediction During the 2007–09 Financial Crisis
At the end of 2007, the U.S. economy entered the longest and most severe recession of the postwar
period. This episode of extreme ﬁnancial turmoil raises a natural question of the accuracy of our
BMA forecasts during that period. The dashed lines in Figures 8–9 depict the realized growth
rates—from quarter t − 1 to quarter t + h—of the variables being forecasted and the level of the
unemployment rate in quarter t+h for h = 1 (Figure 8) and h = 4 (Figure 9). The solid lines depict
the corresponding BMA point forecasts (using only the 20 DD-based portfolios of option-adjusted
credit spreads) made in quarter t, while the shaded bands represent the respective BMA predictive
densities. The data are plotted as of quarter t+h, so for the four-quarter-ahead case, the data for
2010:Q2 show actual growth rates of economic activity from 2009:Q1 to 2010:Q2 and forecasts for
29Table 7: BMA Out-of-Sample Predictive Accuracy
(Predictor Set: All Variables with Raw Credit Spreads)
Forecast Horizon (h quarters)
Economic Activity Indicator h = 0 h = 1 h = 2 h = 3 h = 4
GDP 0.94 0.92 0.87 0.94 0.89
(0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.06) (0.04)
[0.05] [0.04] [0.04] [0.08] [0.05]
Personal consumption expenditures 0.92 0.92 1.00 1.09 1.19
(0.03) (0.07) (0.26) (0.69) (0.80)
[0.06] [0.12] [0.22] [0.31] [0.45]
Business ﬁxed investment 0.87 0.79 0.92 0.93 0.91
(0.00) (0.00) (0.05) (0.07) (0.08)
[0.01] [0.01] [0.06] [0.07] [0.06]
Industrial production 0.96 0.97 1.09 1.10 1.10
(0.03) (0.08) (0.75) (0.64) (0.58)
[0.06] [0.10] [0.50] [0.41] [0.37]
Private employment 0.94 0.95 1.09 1.23 1.20
(0.02) (0.06) (0.72) (0.87) (0.77)
[0.03] [0.08] [0.43] [0.55] [0.40]
Unemployment rate 0.91 0.95 1.11 1.21 1.15
(0.00) (0.06) (0.84) (0.88) (0.72)
[0.00] [0.03] [0.49] [0.57] [0.32]
Exports 0.96 0.94 1.01 1.02 0.88
(0.00) (0.02) (0.26) (0.28) (0.05)
[0.00] [0.01] [0.08] [0.09] [0.01]
Imports 0.91 0.93 0.97 1.03 0.99
(0.00) (0.01) (0.07) (0.27) (0.15)
[0.00] [0.02] [0.07] [0.16] [0.13]
Note: Sample period: 1986:Q1–2010:Q2. The jump-oﬀ date for the out-of-sample recursive forecasts
is 1992:Q1. The forecasted variable is the cumulative growth rate (or change in the case of unemployment
rate) of each economic activity indicator over the speciﬁed forecast horizon. Entries in the table denote
the ratio of the MSPE from the BMA forecast to the MSPE from a direct autoregression (see text
for details). Each model in the BMA forecast consists of a direct autoregression augmented with one
predictor. Bootstrapped p-values (500 replications) for the test of the null hypothesis that the ratio of the
MSPEs is equal to one are shown in round and square brackets, using bootstraps B1 and B2, respectively
(see text for details).
growth over the same period. The real-time nature of our exercise implies that these forecasts were
made in 2009:Q2. If the BMA predictions had perfect foresight, then the predicted and realized
values would coincide.
According to Figure 3, credit spreads started to widen signiﬁcantly in the second half of 2007,
30Figure 8: Real-Time Forecasts of the 2007–09 Financial Crisis
(One-Quarter-Ahead BMA Forecast)
















































































































































































Note: The solid line in each panel depicts the real-time BMA point forecast—using the 20 DD-based
portfolios of option-adjusted credit spreads—of the speciﬁed variable for the one-quarter-ahead forecast horizon;
the dashed line depicts the realized values of the corresponding variable; and the shaded bands represent the
50-, 68-, 90-, and 95-percent percentiles of the predictive density (see text for details). The shaded vertical bar
denotes the 2007–09 NBER-dated recession.
31Figure 9: Real-Time Forecasts of the 2007–09 Financial Crisis
(Four-Quarter-Ahead BMA Forecast)


















































































































































































Note: The solid line in each panel depicts the real-time BMA point forecast—using the 20 DD-based
portfolios of option-adjusted credit spreads—of the speciﬁed variable for the four-quarter-ahead forecast horizon;
the dashed line depicts the realized values of the corresponding variable; and the shaded bands represent the
50-, 68-, 90-, and 95-percent percentiles of the predictive density (see text for details). The shaded vertical bar
denotes the 2007–09 NBER-dated recession.
32concomitant with the slowdown in economic activity predicted by the BMA forecasts. With credit
spreads continuing to move higher, the forecast for economic growth became progressively more
pessimistic, reaching its nadir in 2008:Q4, a period when spreads skyrocketed to a record level after
the collapse of Lehman Brothers. These real-time projections turned out to be quite accurate,
especially at the one-quarter-ahead forecast horizon (Figure 8). The four-quarter-ahead BMA
forecast (Figure 9) also did reasonably well, although it missed the timing of the recession by a
couple of quarters. At this longer forecast horizon, the most pessimistic forecasts were also made in
2008:Q4—applying to the period ending in 2009:Q4—while the realized economic indicators were
generally at their worst in 2009:Q2.
6 Conclusion
This paper has revisited the forecasting of real-time economic activity using a large number of
macroeconomic and ﬁnancial predictors. Our contribution involved expanding the set of ﬁnan-
cial predictors with corporate credit spreads based on bond portfolios sorted by the instrument’s
maturity and credit risk as measured by the issuer’s distance-to-default. These portfolio credit
spreads were constructed directly from the secondary market prices of a large number of senior
unsecured bonds issued by U.S. ﬁnancial and nonﬁnancial corporations. Using a ﬂexible empirical
bond-pricing framework, the micro-level credit spreads were adjusted for the callability of the un-
derlying issue, a pervasive feature of the corporate cash market and one that signiﬁcantly inﬂuences
the information content of credit spreads for future economic activity.
To take explicitly into account model selection issues, we employed Bayesian model averaging
techniques to combine the information content of variables in our predictor set, an approach that
helps to mitigate concerns about data mining. Our results indicate that the accuracy of the BMA
forecasts signiﬁcantly exceeds—both economically and statistically—the accuracy of the forecasts
obtained from a univariate direct autoregression, a benchmark that has proven to be quite diﬃcult
to beat when forecasting real-time economic activity.
The gains in forecasting accuracy stem almost exclusively from the inclusion of the option-
adjusted portfolio credit spreads in the set of predictors—Bayesian model averaging consistently
assigns high posterior probabilities to models that include these ﬁnancial indicators. In contrast,
if the portfolio credit spreads are omitted from the predictor set, the BMA forecasts of future
economic activity are generally statistically indistinguishable from the forecasts obtained from a
direct autoregression. This ﬁnding highlights the rich amount of information contained in corporate
bond spreads, information, as argued by Gilchrist and Zakrajˇ sek [2010], that may be particularly
useful for identifying the importance of credit supply shocks in the determination of macroeconomic
outcomes.
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37Appendices
A DD-Based Portfolios
Table A-1 contains summary statistics of the distances-to-default, credit spreads, and excess equity
returns in the DD-based portfolios; the top panel covers portfolios constructed using asset prices
of nonﬁnancial ﬁrms, while the bottom panel corresponds to their ﬁnancial counterparts. Not
surprisingly, the average distance-to-default increases across the conditional DD bins in both sectors.
The time-series volatility of this default-risk indicator, as measured by its standard deviation,
also increases with the improvement in credit quality, indicating that the DDs of riskier ﬁrms
ﬂuctuate less than those of their more creditworthy counterparts. Consistent with the increase
in the likelihood of default, both the average and the median credit spread decline monotonically
across the conditional DD bins in all maturity categories.
The time-series characteristics of excess equity returns of ﬁrms in the diﬀerent default-risk
categories, by contrast, do not exhibit much of a systematic pattern. In general, less credit-
worthy ﬁrms registered an exceptionally weak performance over the 1986–2010 period, a ﬁnding
consistent with the distress risk anomaly documented by the empirical asset-pricing literature (cf.
Griﬃn and Lemmon [2002] and Campbell et al. [2008]).
38Table A-1: Summary Statistics of DD-Based Portfolios by Type of Firm
Nonﬁnancial Firms DD Bin Mean SD S-Ra Min P50 Max
Distance-to-default 1 2.12 1.02 - -0.83 2.22 4.83
Distance-to-default 2 5.26 1.73 - 0.50 5.63 8.63
Distance-to-default 3 7.62 2.15 - 2.23 8.17 11.3
Distance-to-default 4 11.2 2.86 - 4.87 11.6 16.7
Credit spread (1–5 yr.) 1 2.77 1.82 1.52 0.73 2.27 12.1
Credit spread (1–5 yr.) 2 1.29 0.69 1.88 0.44 1.11 5.16
Credit spread (1–5 yr.) 3 0.94 0.48 1.94 0.29 0.85 3.65
Credit spread (1–5 yr.) 4 0.68 0.36 1.88 0.22 0.58 2.52
Credit spread (5–10 yr.) 1 2.97 1.65 1.80 0.93 2.35 9.65
Credit spread (5–10 yr.) 2 1.48 0.67 2.21 0.59 1.22 4.54
Credit spread (5–10 yr.) 3 0.99 0.45 2.20 0.45 0.86 3.33
Credit spread (5–10 yr.) 4 0.69 0.33 2.08 0.22 0.54 2.15
Credit spread (10–15 yr.) 1 2.51 1.67 1.50 0.87 1.98 13.2
Credit spread (10–15 yr.) 2 1.35 0.72 1.87 0.31 1.09 4.81
Credit spread (10–15 yr.) 3 0.90 0.48 1.89 0.25 0.79 3.45
Credit spread (10–15 yr.) 4 0.65 0.34 1.92 0.21 0.52 1.85
Credit spread (> 15 yr.) 1 2.69 1.61 1.67 0.67 2.34 12.3
Credit spread (> 15 yr.) 2 1.50 0.55 2.74 0.84 1.33 3.80
Credit spread (> 15 yr.) 3 1.10 0.42 2.59 0.51 0.98 3.09
Credit spread (> 15 yr.) 4 0.82 0.31 2.66 0.37 0.74 1.98
Excess Equity Return 1 -0.31 8.11 -0.04 -58.0 0.66 28.8
Excess Equity Return 2 0.08 6.12 0.01 -44.8 0.55 17.3
Excess Equity Return 3 0.05 4.91 0.01 -31.0 0.64 14.8
Excess Equity Return 4 0.19 4.14 0.05 -24.6 0.78 11.2
Financial Firms DD Bin Mean SD S-R Min P50 Max
Distance-to-default 1 1.88 1.22 - -1.33 1.82 4.54
Distance-to-default 2 6.26 3.10 - 0.48 6.07 13.4
Credit spread (1–5 yr.) 1 1.10 0.78 1.41 0.28 0.98 5.38
Credit spread (1–5 yr.) 2 0.91 0.49 1.88 0.22 0.88 3.14
Credit spread (> 5 yr.) 1 1.25 0.57 2.18 0.58 1.10 3.98
Credit spread (> 5 yr.) 2 1.16 0.37 3.16 0.59 1.09 2.54
Excess Equity Return 1 -0.13 8.30 -0.02 -42.8 0.74 22.1
Excess Equity Return 2 0.11 6.51 0.02 -46.4 0.74 15.3
Note: Sample period: Jan1986–June2010. DDs are in units of standard deviations, credit
spreads are in percentage points, and (monthly) excess equity returns are in percent. The (weighted)
average of indicators in month t in each DD bin is based on the DD distribution in month t − 1.
The four DD binds for the nonﬁnancial ﬁrms are based on the quartiles of the distribution; the two
DD bins for the ﬁnancial ﬁrms are based on the median of the distribution (see text for details).
aSharpe ratio.
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